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Standards of American Legislation. By Ernst Freund. Published by the Uni-
versity of Chicago Press. 1917. pp. xx, 327.
In the words of the author this is "an essay of constructive criticism, and
not a systematic treatise." After a review of modern tendencies toward social
legislation and of the judicial attitude toward such tendencies, Professor Freund
devotes several chapters to what may be termed the legal background of his
problem. The common law, statutory enactments, state constitutional provisions,
and judicial doctrines are each reviewed in turn to discover what they have to
contribute to a constructive legislative policy, and in general their contributions
are found to be negative and haphazard. In attempting such a broad survey the
author must necessarily assume much upon the part of his readers. It is too
much, however, to assume that the reader will bring to the book the detailed
familiarity with common law and constitutional law requisite to a full apprecia-
tion of Chapters II to V. The discussion in this part of the book is often too
much in the air. Here and elsewhere the author merely refers to an illustration
the facts of which are in his own mind, without giving the reader a sufficient
basis for an understanding of the illustration (see for example the comparison
between procedural legislation in New York and Illinois, p. 261).
Chapter III has a somewhat misleading title and its parts do not seem to have
been organized into a single whole. Chapter IV is a concrete discussion of the
extent to which state constitutions have sought to lay down policies of legislation,
and Chapter V gives a good review of the development to its present broad
scope of due process and similar broad limitations. In one or two cases, as for
example, with reference to truck legislation in Missouri (pp. 123-124), some
change in statement would be justified by later decisions.
Although in places not sufficiently concrete to be clearly understood by the
reader, Chapters I to V do make it clear that neither the common law, nor
constitutions, nor decisions based on constitutions, nor all of these together, have
given us a body of principles of legislation or materially aided in the development
of such a body of principles (pp. 68-71, 167, 172, 214). It is equally clear from
the author's discussion that such principles have not been developed by legis-
latures themselves.
Chapters I to V of this book really construct a background, and it is to
Chapter VI on "the meaning of principle in legislation" that we must really
look for the author's contribution to the subject under discussion. The author
here lays down two principles of legislation: First, the principle of correlation,
that is, the principle that all phases of a problem should be regarded in legis-
lating upon it. For example, when the legislature came to increase the property
rights of married women, it should under.this principle have considered also
what increased obligations ought properly to flow from the increase of rights.
This is practically a statement that the legislature ought not to look at but one
side of the question to be legislated upon. Second, the principle of standardiza-
tion, which would seek to apply the saine or a similar rule to conditions of the
same general type wherever they are to be legislated upon. Legislation is not
likely to deal at the same time with all the problems of a similar type, but if it
did so, a somewhat uniform standard for all would at once appear desirable.
With matters of a similar type dealt with piecemeal and at different times,
different treatment often results not so much from intention as from want of
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thought. To such conditions the author's principle of standardization is clearly
applicable and as he says, similar legislative treatment of similar conditions is
only to a limited extent produced by judicial applications of the "due process
of law" and the "equal protection of the laws" clauses. The substance of
these two principles is summed up by the author as follows:
"If correlation means more carefully measured justice, standardization serves
to advance the other main objects of law, namely, certainty, objectivity, stability,
and uniformity" (p. 248).
The truth of these principles, as of most general statements, may be acknowl-
edged, but they do not help us very much. They amount to a statement that
thought should be given to each new enactment in its relation to the rest of the
statute book and to the common law, and it must be agreed that such thought
is given much too infrequently. The author's discussion is valuable in calling
attention to the need for such thought, but he himself seems somewhat doubtful
of the value of his principles in the face of a concrete problem presented to the
legislature.
With respect to the principle of correlation, the author looks too much upon
a legislature as an impartial body seeking to find the best rule for the subject
as a whole. As a matter of fact, legislation is the result of a play of interests,
;with first one interest and then another dominant, and the adjustment of the
balance between interests, if it comes, is not likely to come at one time, but
through legislation dealing with the same subject throughout a series of years.
Legislation upon new subjects is piecemeal and experimental, and while more
correlation of opposing interests and of comparable measures is possible, the
practical limits of such correlation are more serious than Professor Freund
seems to realize. These statements are not so true in private law as in public
law, and it is noticeable that most of the author's illustrations of lnck of correla-
tion are drawn from the field of public law where the observance of his
principle is most difficult.
Problems of standardization again must work themselves out through a series
of years, from the first tentative and imperfect legislation in a new field to more
perlect legislation, as experience and knowledge increase-the first imperfect
legislation often being a necessary basis for the experience that is to produce a
more perfect statute. However, this does not involve a denial of the duty of
the lawmaker in each case to avail himself systematically of all available data.
Absence of standardization, as the author indicates, is nowhere so apparent as
in anti-trust legislation (p. 2=), but those who saw an existing evil could
hardly postpone for twenty-five years the devising of any remedy because of
the non-existence of precise standards, with perhaps the realization that such
precise standards would not develop even during the period of such delay; in
spite of this, much can be said for the anti-trust legislation, ineffective as it seems,
on the whole, to have been. And as Professor Freund suggests, the opinion of
experts at any particular period constitutes a very poor basis for legislation,
for experts change in their views from generation to generation, as knowledge
upon any particular subject increases. It is not, therefore, to be concluded that
legislation upon existing information should not be enacted to meet an existing
evil. As the author suggests, the English factory acts would not have been
enacted had the words of so-called experts been accepted as to what were proper
standards (p. 249). So far as the principle of standardization insists upon the
possession for purposes of legislation of all available information, and the study
of the best methods of accomplishing a given result, it is thoroughly acceptable,
but how can it aid in determining Whether in a new field the thing sought by
legislation is desirable or undesirable? Even if it could, these matters of
general policy are mainly determined by the play of forces upon the legislature
and not by scientific standards. This is recognized (pp. 257, 26o, 272) but is
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perhaps not given sufficient weight. Here again public legislation of a general
type is less likely to be standardized until the policy has been rather fully
formulated through successive legislative steps. The old and well-established
principles of common la.w are more likely to be standardized and the same
is true of matters capable to some extent of mathematical statement. The
administrative features of legislation are more apt to be standardized than the
policy of legislation, and, as is suggested by the author, such standardization has
taken place too infrequently. The subject of penalties in statutes, it may be
agreed, is one which can be standardized, and difference in penalties for similar
offenses is more often the result of absence of consideration than of definite
thought upon the part of the legislature.
A failure to adopt definite standards is oftentimes due more to the courts
than to the legislature. The Illinois general assembly, for example, some years
ago passed a law requiring washrooms for workers in bituminous coal mines.
The supreme court of the state held this unconstitutional on the ground that it
was a special law granting a special privilege or immunity, in that coal miners
were favored while persons in other occupations of a similar character were not
accorded the right to have washrooms. In view of the fact that the court did
not in any way determine what classes of occupations should be brought within
the washroom legislation, the general assembly was left either to a specific
enumeration, which might again be held improper because of not including all
occupations to which the law should apply, or to the use of general terms which
should leave to the court by interpretation a determination of the extent of
the statutory requirements. This latter arrangement leaves to the employer in
each case the determination under threat of penalty of whether or not he is
within the terms of the statute, but it was the only alternative of the legislature
if it were to act upon the subject at all, and the subsequent law, much more
unsatisfactory from the standpoint of any legislative principle, was upheld by
the state supreme court (People v. Solomon, 194, 265 Ill. 28). In many cases in
Illinois and other states the court has forced upon the legislature a vague and
indefinite method of legislation which could be avoided were it not for improper
judicial construction of constitutional provisions.
In the concluding chapters of the book under review the author discusses what
he terms constructive factors in legislation, and devotes most of his attention
to the courts and the legislatures. The courts he finds-correctly, it seems to
the reviewer-not to have had much, if any, constructive influence in the
development of proper legislative principles. In this connection it may be worth
while to suggest that our constitutions form the one important body of codified
law in this country. The Constitution of the United States, being somewhat
brief, has presented a definite problem, and its interpretation has been worked
out by the United States Supreme Court to results that, in general, may be
termed satisfactory. The state constitutions, except in a few states, present a
more elaborate effort at codification, and in this field judicial interpretation may
be studied profitably to determine whether the courts have done much of a
constructive character.
The reviewer has just completed the task of going systematically through
the judicial construction of the constitution of Illinois, which is a fair example
of the more detailed constitutions of the middle west. The constitution of
Illinois came into effect in i87o and for some forty-seven years the supreme
court of this state has interpreted its various provisions. As a result of such
interpretation it is not too much to say that the constitution to-day is less definite
in substantially all of its parts than the language of the text would have seemed
at the beginning to indicate. Upon almost every large problem which presented
an alternative of construing the language to be definite and precise, or of
construing it to be so indefinite and standardless as to leave the determination
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in each particular case to the discretion of the court, the court seems to have
chosen the latter alternative, so that in most important problems the legislature,
when it comes to enact laws, has no guide as to what is constitutional and what
unconstitutional, but must enter into a guessing contest with the court-the
court, of course, having the last guess. Upon the basis of this particular experi-
ence, it appears to the reviewer that perhaps the most serious hazard to legis-
lation in a state with a complicated constitution is the necessity under which
the legislature labors in substantially all important legislation of guessing how
the court is likely to act after the legislation has been enacted. What is referred
to here is not the broad due process of law clause of the constitution, nor other
limitations which are themselves broad and indefinable, but constitutional pro-
visions which were intended to mean something specific-provisions into which,
by judicial construction, such indefiniteness has been read that the applica-
tion of the provision in each particular case comes to be a matter within the
discretion of the court, without any standard by which the legislation may
determine in advance what is and what is not within the limits of the constitu-
tion. What has just been referred to constitutes the real hazard of legislation,
and a real bar oftentimes to the establishment of either proper correlation or
proper standards of legislation, and to such constitutional difficulties the author
has given entirely too little attention.
However, this book should be judged, not as a treatise upon the subject of
legislation, but rather as what it purports to be, "an essay of constructive
criticism." Within the limits set out, Professor Freund has produced a valuable
work, and it is to be hoped that in the near future he will give us a book
which deals not merely with the general aspects of the subject, but which will
also seek to chart out something of the detailed difficulties, for after all it is the
details rather than the general principles that constitute the real difficulties in
the problem of state legislation to-day.
W. F. DODD
Legislative Reference Bureau, State of Illinois
Jurisdiction and Practice of Federal Courts. By Charles P: Williams. Pub-
lished by The F. H. Thomas Law Book Co., St. Louis. 1917. pp. xix, 586.
There are many treatises dealing especially with the jurisdiction and procedure
(or practice) of the federal courts not adapted for the law student but intended
entirely for the practitioner, e. g., Desty, Foster, Rose, Loveland, Montgomery;
there are other treatises devoted largely to equity jurisdiction and practice, e. g.,
Street, Whitehouse, and'Simkins's novel treatise on the questions of jurisdiction
and practice arising in the prosecution of an equity suit from its filing to the
decree of the court of last resort; also Simkins's A Federal Suit at Law,
accorded similar treatment, both of which are highly useful in the student's
hands but are of greater appeal to the practitioner. Nor is there lack of treatises
on the subject intended for law students primarily: Curtis, Hughes and Simon-
ton at once occur to the law teacher.
Curtis's lectures on federal jurisdiction were delivered in 1872-1873 to the stu-
dents of Harvard Law School, and have a very pleasing style; some discussion
of practice is included, but so old a discussion of this subject, no matter how
valuable at the time, will not suffice for the present requirements. Curtis pre-
ferred to begin at the top of the federal judicial system and work down through
the Supreme Court, Circuit Courts and District Courts; Hughes chose the other
course and moves from the District Court upwards through the Circuit Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court along the channel through which the suit nor-
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mally travels. Mr. Williams also prefers to work from the lower court to the
higher and has the curent law school view of that matter with him.
It is clearly logical to begin with a perspective of the source and distribution of
jurisdiction and the organization or scheme of courts, following with a study of
each court in an upwardly progressive series. After an initial chapter of an
introductory or ground-laying nature, Mr. Williams treats the District Court in
its territorial aspects, such as venue, process, local and non-local actions; he
then considers its jurisdiction as based on the federal question, diversity of cit-
izenship, amount involved, and removals. Thereupon a pertinent treatment of
the procedure at law and in equity follows; the criminal law and procedure, and
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction and procedure, conclude the treatment of
the District Courts.
The courts of appellate jurisdiction are treated together, and the decisions
reviewable, as well as the procedure in law and equity on review, are discussed
with careful attention. The volume closes with a study of the review of the
decisions of the state court of last resort in the Supreme Court and the proce-
dure on error or by certiorari incident thereto.
The plan of treatment is logical throughout, the discussion is crisp and sug-
gestive, and the author neither shies at the points upon which the courts seem
muddled, nor hesitates on occasion to express an opinion as to the correct rule
in the matter. The book has the flavor of practice, but it is eminently fitted for
the mature law school student. The author injects enough of the history of
substantive and procedural matters to orient the reader properly-a course admit-
tedly necessary in the case of the student of the subject, and highly desirable for
the practitioner. Suggestive summaries are frequently introduced to illustrate
the substantive law or procedure where complete treatment would involve a mass
of detail, and the cases cited are numerous and apposite, making use of the
latest decisions and rules of practice, and presenting a treatment thoroughly
down to date. Although possibly a matter of opinion only, yet it seems that a
discussion of bankruptcy would have answered a more general need than
admiralty law and practice, inasmuch as in the author's view something had to
be omitted.
The distribution of space in the book shows the tremendous importance of the
District Courts in the federal judicial system under present statutes, but does not
exaggerate that matter although seventy-five per cent. is thus used; the appellate
courts use about twenty per cent. of the space, and the introductory chapter the
remainder.
Much reading of cases and study of rules of procedure and of pleadings must
supplement any handbook, and of course Mr. Williams has not pretended to
make a volume which would dispense with that necessity. He does provide the
student and practitioner with a highly useful tool, and his suggestive and envisag-
ing manner of treatment gives the book a distinct place in the literature of
the subject.
GEORGE W. RIGHTmI=E
Ohio State University College of Law
